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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HELEN JANE WALTERS,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent

:

vs.

:

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

:

Case No. 930272-CA

:

Priority 15

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this domestic relations matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I. Did the trial court err by determining that unique or exceptional circumstances
existed which warranted a reallocation of Defendant's pre-marital property?
This question challenges the trial court's Findings of Fact. The applicable standard
of review is a clearly erroneous standard. The appellate court may disturb the trial court's
Findings of Fact if such findings are clearly erroneous. Hagan v. Hagan. 810 P.2d 478, 481
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(Utah App. 1991); Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App. 1991). The appellate court
should also review the trial court's decision on the basis that it is clearly unjust and a clear abuse
of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 751 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah App. 1988).
II. Did the trial court err by not applying appropriate partnership dissolution rules
when it reallocated the Defendant's pre-marital property after determining that the parties had a
partnership relationship prior to the solemnization of their marriage?
This question calls for a review of the trial court's Conclusions of Law. The
appellate court should review the trial court's Conclusions of Law with no particular deference
and should review such Conclusions of Law for correctness. Oats v. Chavez, 749 P.2d 658 (Utah
1988).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §48-1-15, §48-1-37, and §30-1-4.5 (1953 as amended) are the
applicable statutes in this matter, copies of which are included in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter comes before the appellate court for the second time.1 The trial court
originally ruled that the parties had a marriage-like relationship on or about January 1, 1980 (R.
99, 103) (though the marriage was not solemnized until October 5, 1984) and distributed the
property of the parties on the basis that they had a common law marriage pursuant to Utah Code

!

This matter has previously been appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 890671CA; Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991).
2

Ann. §30-l-4.5.2 (R. 147). The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court to properly
categorize the parties property as marital or pre-marital based on the marriage date of October
5, 1984. (R. 210). The court could then consider whether unique or exceptional circumstances
existed meriting premarital property to be included in the marital estate.
On remand, the trial court determined that "unique circumstances" existed allowing
the court to exercise its discretion to reallocate premarital property. (R. 231). The court found
"that from January 1980 until the time the parties were married, they commingled their earnings
and efforts in such a way as to establish, for all intents and purposes, a partnership." (R. 232).
On such basis, the trial court ruled that the Plaintiff was entitled to a reallocation of Defendant's
premarital property. (R. 232).
There are principally three parcels of real property which are at issue—Parcel 1,
located in a trailer park at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah; Parcel 2, located in a trailer
park at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah; and Parcel 3, located at 6072 West 9600
North, Highland, Utah.3
Parcel 1 was acquired by the Defendant in 1980 at a cost of $11,500. (Tr. 57).
The Defendant also paid $2,165 for hookups for electricity and sewer (Tr. 57), and $700 for the

2

The trial court applied U.C.A. §30-4-4.5 retroactively. Section 30-4.4.5 was not adopted
until 1987.
3

There is a fourth parcel of which the parties have stipulated that Defendant has no equitable
interest in as he is listed as a legal owner only as an accommodation to his son to enable his son
to acquire equitable interests in the property.
3

concrete pad. (Tr. 58). In addition, the Defendant hired a backhoe to put the water line and
sewer line in. (Tr. 58). The Defendant participated with preparing and laying the concrete pad
and the driveway. (Tr. 60). An addition to the driveway was paid for by the Defendant (Tr. 60),
as was a retaining wall, two sheds, and a fence. (Tr. 61).
In 1980, the Defendant permitted the Plaintiff to move her trailer on the pad
located at Parcel 1 and live there rent free. (Tr. 28, 45, 56). At that time, the Plaintiff was being
evicted from another trailer park. (Tr. 44). In addition to paying $521.00 for cost of moving the
Plaintiffs trailer, the Defendant further assisted the Plaintiff by paying a number of debts and
obligations of the Plaintiffs which included IRS-$4,000.00; State Tax Commission--$2,700.00;
payment on Plaintiffs trailer~$3,000.00; payment on car loan-$400.00; payment on television
loan~$ 150.00; and bills from a Wyoming accident~$ 1000.00. [Transcript and exhibit from
original trial (Tr. 86-88, 105-106) (Ex. 13)] All of these expenses were paid prior to the
marriage in 1984. The Defendant also spent $5,000.00 for the remodeling of the Plaintiffs trailer
of which he performed much of the labor himself. (Tr. 67). These improvements included tearing
out the living room and remodeling it, reinsulating, rewiring, putting up sheetrock, putting in new
lighting, replacing the kitchen floor, building new cabinets, building a closet, and purchasing new
windows. (Tr. 67).

The Defendant also provided money to the Plaintiff when she was

unemployed. (Tr. 39).
In exchange for moving on Parcel 1 rent free, the Plaintiff agreed to coordinate
all of the improvements needed, of which the Defendant would pay for. (Tr. 55, 56). With
4

regards to helping with improvements to Parcel 1, the Plaintiff helped coordinate the laying of
concrete (Tr. 15, 21, 23, 26), laid sod, and planted flowers and trees. (Tr. 26). The Plaintiff
helped assist with the numerous improvements to her trailer itself, both inside and outside. (Tr.
14, 15, 35). These improvements were paid for by the Defendant. (Tr. 67).
Parcel 2 was acquired in 1985 after the parties were married. The Defendant paid
$10,500.00 for the property along with the associated hookup costs of $2,165.00. (Tr. 62). The
Defendant's trailer was moved onto this property. At the time of the original trial, Parcel 2 had
an encumbrance of approximately $5,000.00. (R. 238-239). The Defendant was held solely and
individually liable for this debt. (R. 251). With regards to improvements to Parcel 2, all expenses
were paid for by the Defendant. The Plaintiff helped coordinate the necessary cement work, and
prepared the Defendant's trailer for rental. (Tr. 37).
In 1977, the Defendant purchased Parcel 3 for $8,000.00. (Tr. 53). He made a
final payment for Parcel 3 in the amount of $1,682.15 on May 23, 1981. (R. 239).

The

Defendant paid for substantial improvements to Parcel 3, including the construction of a 24'x 40'
metal building, a sump tank, footings and a foundation wall, and concrete work. (Tr. 53, 54).
The Plaintiff helped coordinate certain of these improvements such as arranging for the
construction of the building, digging and laying of water pipes, back filling and leveling, and the
laying of PVC Pipe and concrete. (Tr. 39).
The trial court found that parcels 1 and 3 were the Defendant's premarital property,
whereas each of the parties had a 50% interest in Parcel 2. (R. 239). The court then awarded
5

Parcel 1 to the Plaintiff and parcels 2 and 3 to the Defendant. (R. 250). The Defendant was
further held solely and individually liable for the debt owing on Parcel 2. (R. 251).
On April 21, 1993, the Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal from the decision
rendered by Judge Ray M. Harding. (R. 254).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There were not unique or exceptional circumstances which warranted the trial court
to reallocate the Defendant's pre-marital property. The facts and circumstances of which the trial
court listed, though great in number, are not unique in nature, either singularly or collectively.
A majority of the circumstances in which the trial court relied on deal with the parties pre-marital
relationship and the findings are akin to recognizing once again a common law marriage before
the common law marriage statute was enacted.
The Plaintiff derived a great financial benefit from her pre-marital relationship with
the Defendant.

The Defendant paid off substantial debts for the Plaintiff and moved her trailer

to his trailer pad where he permitted her to live rent free.

With the financial and physical

assistance from the Defendant, the Plaintiff obtained significant improvements to her trailer.
Though the Plaintiff did help arrange for and make physical improvements to the Defendant's
realty, such improvements were paid for by the Defendant. The efforts of the Plaintiff, on the
other hand, were not a substantial contribution to the growth of the Defendant's realty. A close
reading of the record shows those efforts consisted of mainly organizing her friends to do
concrete work. This added no appreciable value to the property as shown by Plaintiffs appraisal.
6

The extensive costs expended on the Plaintiffs behalf prevented the Defendant from enhancing
his properties. These properties were not accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the
parties as the trial court found. The trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, and its decision
is clearly unjust and a clear abuse of discretion.
Rather than calling the parties pre-marital relationship a "marriage like
relationship", the trial court found that from January 1980 until the time the parties were married,
the nature of the parties' relationship, for all intents and purposes, was a partnership. The trial
court, in its Memorandum Decision, determined that the Plaintiffs contributions of time and
money to partnership endeavors entitled Plaintiff to a reallocation of Defendant's pre-marital
property. (R. 232). The trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and amended decree,
do not reflect a partnership distribution, and are thus inconsistent with the court's written
Memorandum Decision. Furthermore, the trial court did not apply partnership distribution rules
as required by Utah Code Ann. §§48-1-15 and 48-1-37. The trial court's Conclusions of Law
should be reviewed for their correctness.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WERE NOT UNIQUE OR EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
WHICH WARRANTED THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEFENDANT'S
PREMARITAL PROPERTY.
The trial court acknowledged the general rule cited in Haumont v. Haumont 793
P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) which states that typically, each party is to "retain the separate
7

property he or she brought into the marriage." At 424. (R. 231). It further noted that trial courts
have the discretion to "reallocate premarital property" where "unique circumstances" exist. Id (R.
231). The court then relied on facts and circumstances set forth in paragraph 10(a-l) of the
original findings and conclusions signed October 5, 1989, and found such to be "unique" in
nature. (R. 232).4 The Defendant submits that the facts and circumstances in paragraph 10(a-l)
are not unique in nature, either singularly or collectively. Furthermore, by relying on such
circumstances as "unique" in nature, is akin to once again recognizing a "marriage like
relationship" prior in time to when Utah's common law marriage statute was enacted. Utah Code
Ann. §30-1-4.5 (1987).
Looking closely at paragraph 10(a-l) of the findings and conclusions signed
October 5, 1989 (R. 150-152), and paragraph 3(A-L) of the findings and conclusions signed
March 23, 1993 (R. 235-237), the facts and circumstances are not "unique" in nature.
Each subparagraph is not unique in nature unless perhaps one is trying to establish
that there was a "marriage like relationship". For instance, the first subparagraph states that "The
parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4 December, 1978". (R. 150, 235). This surely is not
unique in nature.
The second subparagraph points out that the Plaintiff resided in her mobile home
in Orem, Utah, and when the Defendant was not working out of state on temporary duty

Paragraph 10(a-l) were reincorporated into the trial courts last Findings and Conclusions as
Paragraph 3(A-L). (R. 235-237).
8

assignments, he would stay with the Plaintiff in her mobile home. (R. 150, 235). Again, this is
not unique in nature.
Likewise, in all twelve subparagraphs of these findings, none are unique in nature,
either singularly or collectively, which would warrant the distribution of the Defendant's premarital property.

These subparagraphs only evidence that the parties had a pre-marital

relationship and that the Plaintiff derived great benefit from such relationship at the financial
sacrifice of the Defendant.

Of these findings, only subparagraph "e/E" remotely represents

circumstances that would permit the Plaintiff to have a share of the Defendant's pre-marital
property. (This will be further addressed below concerning the Plaintiffs contribution toward
the growth of the Defendant's separate assets.) In summary, by recognizing the aforementioned
subparagraphs as "unique" in nature, would, in essence, be once again recognizing a "marriage
like relationship" before Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 was enacted in 1987. As this court has
already ruled, §30-4-4.5 may not be applied retroactively. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 69
(Utah App. 1991).
As instructed by the Court of Appeals, the trial court points out that it considered
the factors suggested in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) for determining unique
circumstances. As Burke points out, the factors that are generally considered are:
the amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the
property was acquired before or during the marriage; the source of
the property; the health of the parties; the parties' standard of
living, respective financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity;
the duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; the
9

parties' ages at time of marriage and of divorce; what the parties
gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship the
property division has with the amount of alimony and child support
to be awarded. Of particular concern . . . is whether one spouse
has made any contribution toward the growth of the separate assets
of the other spouse and whether the assets were accumulated or
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties, (emphasis added).
Id. at 135; Walters, 812 P.2d at 67. After considering such factors, a trial court may reallocate
premarital property if unique circumstances exist. Id; Haumont 793 P.2d at 424-25.
The trial court states that it gave special attention to the factor most emphasized
in Burke: "Of particular concern . . . is whether one spouse has made any contribution toward
the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether the assets were accumulated
or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties." At 135. (R. 232). The trial court concluded that
the Plaintiff made a substantial contribution to the growth of the Defendant's separate assets.
The Defendant asserts that the efforts of the Plaintiff were not a substantial
contribution to the growth of the Defendant's realty. A close reading of the record indicates that
those efforts primarily consisted of organizing her friends to do concrete work. (Tr. 15, 16, 17,
19, 23, 26, 33, 37, 38, 55, 56). She also planted some sod and flowers on parcel 1. (Tr. 26).
This added no appreciable value to the property awarded to her as shown by the Plaintiffs
appraiser. (R. 243, 244). The Plaintiffs appraisal valued Parcel's 1 and 2 at the same value, each
at $20,000.00.

The Plaintiffs appraisal does not reflect an appreciable value for the

improvements on Parcel 1 of which the Plaintiff was involved.
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All of the improvements which were made on the properties were paid for by the
Defendant. (Tr. 49). In addition to paying off the payments on the Plaintiffs trailer home
totaling $3,500.00 (Tr. 67), the Defendant spent over $5,000.00 for improvements to the
Plaintiffs trailer (Tr. 67), all to the benefit of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff derived further financial
benefit from the Defendant as he moved her trailer, at a cost of $521, to his pad located on
Parcel 1 where she was permitted to live rent free. The Defendant further assisted the Plaintiff
by paying off her debts and obligations which included $4,000.00 to the IRS, $2,700.00 to the
State Tax Commission, $400.00 for a car loan, $150.00 for a television loan, and bills from a
Wyoming accident totaling $1,000.00. [transcript and exhibit from original trial (Tr. 86-88, 105106) (Ex. 13)]. All of these expenses were paid prior to the parties marriage in 1984. The
Defendant also paid substantial amounts of money to the Plaintiff for services rendered and to
keep her going at home. (Tr. 67, 68).
The trial court is mistaken by finding that the Plaintiff was a financial contributor
to the relationship which allowed the Defendant the ability to pool his resources and use them
for the purchase of his properties. (R. 240). It is quite evident that the Plaintiffs financial
assistance did not enhance the Defendant.

He could have and would have paid for the

improvements and properties with or without her. (Tr. 64). He was of great assistance to her at
his expense. Without the considerable payments on the Plaintiffs behalf, the Defendant would
have better been able to dedicate his resources to accumulating and enhancing his properties.

11

It is evident that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. The record is clear
that there are not unique circumstances which warrant the reallocation of the Defendant's premarital property. The trial court's decision is clearly unjust and a clear abuse of discretion.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT APPLY APPROPRIATE PARTNERSHIP
DISSOLUTION RULES WHEN IT REALLOCATED THE DEFENDANT'S
PRE-MARITAL PROPERTY AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE
PARTIES HAD A PARTNERSHIP RELATIONSHIP PRIOR TO THE
SOLEMNIZATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE.
It is evident that the trial court struggled with the prospect of not being able to
treat the parties' pre-marital relationship as a "marriage like relationship". The court overcame
this by determining that the relationship, for all intents and purposes, was a partnership, as stated
in the court's Memorandum Decision. (R. 232). However, the court's determination that there
was a partnership, was not incorporated in the court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
amended decree, and thus they are inconsistent with the court's Memorandum Decision. By
recognizing a partnership, the trial court should have applied the appropriate partnership
dissolution rules when reallocating the Defendant's pre-marital property. These rules were not
used, resulting in the pre-marital property being distributed in an inequitable manner.
The applicable partnership dissolution rules require that each partner should be
repaid their respective contributions and that the liabilities should be paid proportionately. Utah
Code Ann. §§48-1-15, 48-1-37 (1953 as amended). Section 48-1-15(1) states that "Each partner
shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of capital or advances to the partnership
12

property . . . and must contribute towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained
by the partnership according to his share in the profits." Id Section 48-1-37(4) further states that
"The partners shall contribute as provided by Subsection 48-1-15(1) the amount necessary to
satisfy the liabilities . . .".Id
To properly apply these rules, the trial court should have determined the respective
contributions of the parties and then distributed the properties accordingly. The court's allocation
of the properties were inequitably divided as the Defendant was not properly credited for his
significant contributions. The Plaintiff, however, was credited for contributions which were
insignificant in nature or that applied solely to the betterment of her own personal property.
Because the trial court failed to properly apply the partnership dissolution rules,
a manifest injustice occurred, and the court's conclusions of Law should be reviewed for their
correctness.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred by determining that there were "unique" circumstances which
warranted the allocation of Defendant's pre-marital property. The Plaintiffs contributions of time
and money did not significantly enhance the pre-martial properties accumulated by the Defendant.
The Defendant's contributions to the Plaintiff on the other hand were significant in nature, which
inhibited the Defendant from accumulating and improving his properties.

The trial court's

findings are clearly erroneous and the court's decision is clearly unjust and a clear abuse of
discretion.
13

The trial court concluded that the parties relationship was, for all intents and
purposes, a partnership. The trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and amended
decree, however, do not reflect a partnership distribution, and are thus inconsistent with the
court's written Memorandum Decision. To apply proper partnership dissolution rules, the trial
court should have determined the respective contributions of the parties and then distributed the
properties accordingly.

It is important that the trial court's conclusions of Law should be

reviewed for their correctness.
The Defendant asks that the Court of Appeals remand this case to the Fourth
Judicial District Court to enable it to properly distribute the pre-marital property with instructions
that there were not unique circumstances warranting the allocation of the Defendant's pre-marital
property. If a redistribution is merited, the applicable partnership dissolution rules should be
applied distributing the properties according to the respective contributions of the parties.
DATED this 19th day of August, 1993.

iLhurt
ROBERT L. MOODY
TAYLOR, MOODY &lTHORNE
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of August, 1993, I did mail two true and
correct copies of the foregoing to Dana D. Burrows, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, 387 West
Center, Orem, Utah 84057; postage prepaid.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER:

8724 0 8

vs .
LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court after defendant's appeal
to the Utah Court of Appeals.

The appellate court has remanded

for this court's further consideration of the division of the
parties' property. Consistent with the appellate court's
decision, this court amends its prior ruling and finds that the
parties' marriage began upon solemnization on October 5, 1984.
Accordingly, parcels of real estate purchased by defendant prior
to that date are deemed pre-marital property.
This Court acknowledges the general rule cited in Haumont v.
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) that each party is
typically to "retain the separate property he or she brought into
the marriage."

However, as the Court of Appeals properly noted,

trial courts have the discretion to "reallocate premarital
property" where "unique circumstances" exist.

Id. This Court

finds that unique circumstances exist in this case which warrant
a reallocation of defendant's premarital property so as to grant
the parcel upon which plaintiff's trailer is situated to the
plaintiff as was awarded in this court's original Amended Decree
of Divorce.
Such unique circumstances include those set forth in
paragraph 10(a-l) of the Court's Findings and Conclusions signed
October 5, 1989.

In summary, the Court finds that from January

1980 until the time the parties were married, they commingled
their earnings and efforts in such a way as to establish, for all
intents and purposes, a partnership.

The nature of the parties'

relationship and plaintiff's contributions of time and money to
partnership endeavors entitles plaintiff to a reallocation of
defendant's "premarital property" in the manner described in the
Court's Amended Decree.
After full consideration of the factors suggested in Burke
v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987), the Court finds that
unique circumstances exist in this case.

This Court has given

special attention to the factor most emphasized by the Supreme
Court:

"Of particular concern . . .

is whether one spouse has

made any contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of
the other spouse and whether the assets were accumulated or
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties."

Id.

Plaintiff in

this case clearly made a substantial contribution to the growth
of defendant's separate assets.

As the Court noted in its

Findings and Conclusions, plaintiff helped arrange for and make
considerable improvements to defendant's realty on which her

mobile home was placed and to another parcel that defendant was
purchasing at the time.

Further, because defendant's realty at

issue was acquired and improved during the time in which the
parties were commingling their earnings and efforts, the Court
finds that such assets "were accumulated or enhanced by the joint
efforts of the parties."

Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to

an equitable share of such assets, i.e., she is entitled to the
parcel on which her mobile home was placed.
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an order within 15 days
of this decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to
submission to the Court for signature.

This memorandum decision

has no effect until such order is signed by the Court.

Dated this 18th day of December, 1992.

cc:

Dana D. Burrows, Esq.
Robert L. Moody, Esq.

DANA D. BURROWS - 5405
Attorney for Plaintiff
387 West Center
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

:

Defendant.

Civil No. CV 87 2408

:

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 23rd day of
September, 1992, pursuant to those issues that were remanded by the
Court of Appeals.
Court's

further

The Appellate Court has remanded for this

consideration

the

division

of

the parties1

property. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented by her
attorney of record, Dana D. Burrows.

Defendant also appeared

personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L.
Moody.
parties

Both parties gave testimony, as did other witnesses. The
each

introduced

several

stipulations into the record.

exhibits

and

stated

their

Being thereby and otherwise fully

apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and filings regarding
this matter, this Court, having taken the matter under advisement
and having issued its Memorandum Decision, now hereby enters the
following:

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Consistent with the Appellate Court's decision, this

Court amends its prior ruling and;finds that the parties' marriage
began upon solemnization on October 5, 1984. Accordingly, parcels
of real property purchased by Defendant prior to that date are
deemed premarital property.
2.

This Court acknowledges the general rule cited in Haumont

v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,242 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) that each party
is typically to "retain the separate property he or she brought
into the marriage."

However asl the Court of Appeals properly

noted, trial courts have the discretion to "reallocate premarital
property" where "unique circumstances" exist. Id. This Court finds
that unique circumstances exist in this case which warrant a
reallocation of Defendant's premarital property so as to grant the
parcel upon which Plaintiff's trailer is situated to the Plaintiff
as was awarded in this Court's original Amended Decree of Divorce.
3.

Such unique circumstances include those set forth below:
A.

The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4

December, 1978.
B.

At the time they met, Plaintiff resided in her

mobile home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 1200
West, Orem, Utah.

Although Defendant's employment

sometimes

required temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided
missile sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when
not on TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her
mobile home.
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C.

In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own

name, a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At
that same time the parties moved plaintiff's mobile home onto that
pad where they continued to cohabit. Defendant paid for the costs
of moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as
the costs incurred for culinary wjater and sewer connections.
D.

Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the

placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the
realty as her residence.
E.

At

various

assignments, Plaintiff

times

helped

improvements to the Defendants

when

arrange
realty

Defendant
for

was

on

TDY

and make physical

on which her mobile home was

placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and
situated

at

6072

West

9600

North,

Highland,

Utah.

Such

improvements included the laying of concrete pads at each location,
leveling, laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction
of outbuildings and a metal building.
F.

While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings

toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living
expenses.

Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the

realty.
G.

When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant

was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain
Plaintiff and her daughter.
H.

Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's

separate debts owed to the I.R.S.., the Utah State Tax Commission,
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an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile
accident.
I.

Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor

daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and
permission, and prior to solemnisation of the marriage, attended
school under Defendant's family name of Walters.
J.

Defendant listed his address on his federal and

state income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove,
Utah—the same as Plaintiff's residence—for each of the years
1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983.
K.

Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in

his federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent
children who lived with you11 for each of the years 1982, 1983, and
1984.
L.

The evidence does not indicate that the parties'

relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage.
4.

Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter

(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove|, Utah, continuously since on or
about May 1980. Plaintiff's daugjhter has attended the elementary
and secondary

schools servicing that address

for her entire

education and has been and is a {member of the local ward of the
church also servicing that address. Prior to May 1980, Plaintiff
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home
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has been the minor's only home.
5.

Defendant has been emplqyed as a civilian employee of the

federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial.
6.

During the parties1 marriage, Plaintiff has been an

employee of United Stated Steel Corporation except for a period
when her employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was
the location where she was employed.

At the time of the original

trial, Plaintiff had been re-empJoyed by Geneva Steel for a period
of approximately one year.
7.

As of the date of the original trial Defendant was the

record owner of four parcels of realtv, to wit:
A.

Parcel 1 —
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is

located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72-foot
Concord.
B.

Parcel 2 —
640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is

located a 1975 70-foot Brighton mobile home.
C.

Parcel 3 —
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.

D.

Parcel 4 —
746 West 600 North], Or em, Utah.

8.

Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel

2 was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract for the purchase of Parcel 3 in July 1977, reciting
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a down payment of $2,200.00 with apiual payments toward the balance
of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to commence in
June 1978.

Defendant made a final payment for Parcel 3 in the

amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May 1981.

The parties have stipulated

that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem parcel and
that

he

is

listed

as

legal owner of

Parcel

4 only

as an

accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable
interests in the property.
any debt.

Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by

Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a

balance as of the date of the original trial in the amount of
approximately $5,000.00.
9.

The Walters1 marriage began on October 5, 1984, and as

such all marital property acquired prior to that time is premarital
property of Defendant.

Specifically, Parcels 1, 3 and 4 are

premarital property of Defendant, whereas each of the parties has
a 50% interest in Parcel 2.
10.

The

Court

now

considers

the

following

exceptional

circumstances in effectuating an equitable distribution of the
marital and premarital property:

whether one spouse has made any

contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the other
spouse and whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the
joint efforts of the parties; amount and kind of property to be
divided; whether the property was acquired before or during the
marriage; source of the property; health of the parties; the
parties1 standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs
and earning capacity; the duration of the marriage; the children of
6
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the marriage; the parties1 ages at time of marriage and of divorce;
what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary
relationship that property division has with the amount of alimony
and child support to be awarded*
11.

The

court

finds

that

based

upon

the

exceptional

circumstances set forth in paragraph 10 above, that Parcels 1, 3
and 4 were acquired prior to the actual marriage but during the
time period that the parties were actually cohabiting as applied to
Parcels 1 and 3.

It appears that Parcel 4 was purchased prior to

the time that the parties were cohabiting but that payments were
made subsequent to cohabitation.
12.

Plaintiff

in this ca?e

clearly made

a

substantial

contribution to the growth of Defendant's separate assets. As the
Court noted in its Findings and Conclusions, Plaintiff helped
arrange for and make considerable improvements to Defendant's
realty on which her mobile home was placed and to another parcel
the Defendant was purchasing at the time.

Further, because

Defendant's realty at issue was acquired and improved during the
time in which the parties were commingling their earnings and
efforts, the Court finds that such assets "were accumulated or
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties."
13.

The source of the property was that of the purchase by

Defendant in each of the cases of the premarital properties.
However, Plaintiff

was

also

a

financial

contributor

to the

relationship which allowed Defendant the ability to pool his
resources and use for the purchase of said properties. Were it not
7
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for Plaintiff's help however, Defendant would have needed to use
his resources in other manners and would not have been able to
purchase said properties,
14-

The court finds that each of the parties are in good

health-

The parties each have; standards of living that are

reasonably consistent with that prior to entry into the marriage.
However, Plaintiff was not employed for a period of time at the
request of Defendant which has injured the Plaintiff as it relates
to retirement and the opportunity to purchase items on her own
while the parties were living together but prior to their marriage
which occurred over a period of four to five years.
15.

The parties were married for approximately three years

prior to separation and lived together for a period of seven years
total.

The duration of the marriage was approximately five years

and there are no children of this marriage, though Plaintiff has a
child from a prior marriage who is presently age 16.
16.

Defendant has no child support or alimony obligation to

the Plaintiff and as such the property division is critical because
it is the main asset that remains to be divided.
17.

The court finds that Plaintiff has made substantial

contributions toward the purchase and growth of the separate assets
of Defendant, in particular Parcels 1, 3 and 4 and as such the
value of the properties has been enhanced by the efforts of
Plaintiff.

Specifically,

Plaintiff

during

the

parties1

relationship prior to the marriage was gainfully employed and spent
a substantial portion of her income to provide food and clothing
8
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for the parties as well
Defendant's vehicle•

as purchase

of

a transmission

for

Plaintiff also purchased a majority of the

tools that were used to improve the properties which had a cost to
the Plaintiff of approximately $500.

Plaintiff also engaged in

physical labor on the properties such as laying the PVC pipe and
wire mesh and rebar for the cement slabs. Plaintiff also acted as
a hod carrier in the brick work that was performed as well as
sheetrocking, taping, sanding and painting the structures.

The

Plaintiff also cleaned and painted the trailer that is awarded to
Defendant and leveled the ground where it is presently located.
Plaintiff also supported Defendant by working in the parties'
residence while they cohabited ana performed domestic labors that
benefitted Defendant as well. Plaintiff was willing to be engaged
in employment outside of the home but didn't do so at the request
of Defendant.
18.
February

Defendant previously testified at the original trial on
7,

1989, as to

the purchase

prices

and

costs

of

improvements dedicated to parcels, 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of
trial.

The

parties

previously

stipulated

to

this

court's

acceptance into evidence of written appraisals of the parcels
offered by Plaintiff and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a
Certified Review Appraiser. This court considered Mr. Lamoreaux's
assessment of the valuation of the parcels more credible than
Defendant's own assessment for the following reasons:
A.

Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively
9
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on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to
each parcel.
Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and
shopping, existence or nonexistence of public improvements, adverse
easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout, insulation,
adequacy

of

storage

and

closets,

appeal

and

marketability,

remaining economic life, availability for expansion, comparisons to
recent sale of similar and proximate properties, income potential,
highest and best use, and replacement cost.
B.

Defendant

testified

to

having

no

significant

training or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar
properties.
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he
is a designated

appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage

Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor,
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association.
Upon the foregoing, this court accepts and adopts the
valuations placed ont he properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit:
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home:
10

$20,000.00

19.

Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home:

$20,000.00

Parcel 3, with improvements:

$10,000.00

With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance

affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and
the parties1

separate debts incurred since the date of their

separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for
which either party is liable either jointly or individually.
20.

Defendant now submits additional appraisals stating the

values of Parcel 1 as $24,675.00 and Parcel 2 as $17,500.00.
21.

The court finds that the appraisals by Mr. Lamoreaux have

previously been adopted by the court and that the issue of
valuation of the properties is not in dispute and was not reversed
by the Court of Appeals. As such, the court will not consider the
values set forth in the appraisals by Defendantf s most recent
appraiser, but will rather affirm the values as established by Mr.
Lamoreaux.
22.

Each party is entitled to one-half of the other parties1

retirement that accrued from the commencement of the ceremonial
marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce.

Each party shall

cooperate and provide the appropriate information to the other
party

so

that

Qualified

Domestic

Relations

Orders

can

be

implemented to that affect.
23.

Each party should be responsible for their own attorney's

fees and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by
the Court of Appeals.
24.

The

parties

have

stipulated

and

the

judgment

for

11
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Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect, plus
any

accruing

interest.

This

judgment

represents

$400 from

Defendant's Deseret Bank account and $2,750 from Defendant's
America First Thrift account.

Defendant should be awarded the

remainder of each account.
25.

Defendant should be held solely and individually liable

for all debt encumbering, associated with or owing for the realty,
improvements and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the

parties' equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right, title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements—including the mobile home—
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah.

Defendant

should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff.
Defendant should retain all right, title and interests in and to
the parties1 realty and improvements—including the mobile home—
situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
Such

division

is

equitable

considering

the

exceptional

circumstances which are considered during the time that the parties
lived together prior to their marriage as well as owing to the time
periods during which such equities were acquired in relation to the
12
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marital

relationship

solemnization

of

that

their

existed
marriage,

between
owing

the parties
to

the

after

respective

contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the
long-established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of
the monetary values of the properties, owing to the fact that
Plaintiff was a major contributor as to the labor performed and
arranged which improved the properties, owing to the fact that
Plaintiff was employed and provided other necessities for Defendant

I

which freed up Defendant's incom^ to make the actual payments on
the properties prior to the parties1 marriage, owing to the age of
the parties and the duration of the marriage and the fact that
Plaintiff gave up substantial earning capacity at the request of
Defendant, owing to the fact that Defendant has no alimony or child
support obligation to the Plaintiff and that the real property is
the only remaining assets to be divided and owing to the fact that
Plaintifff s contributions toward the growth of Defendantf s separate
property vastly enhanced the value of said properties.
2.

Defendant should be held solely and individually liable

for all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty,
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah.

Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless

therefrom.
3.

Each party is awarded a one-half interest in the other
13
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party's retirement that accumulated from the date of the parties'
ceremonial marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce.

Both

parties shall cooperate and provide the necessary information to
the other parties so that Qualified Domestic Relations Orders may
be implemented.
4.

Each party is responsible for their own attorney's fees

and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by the
Court of Appeals.
5.

The

parties

have

stipulated

and

the

judgment

for

Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect, plus
any

accruing

interest.

This

judgment

represents

$400

from

Defendant's Deseret Bank account and $2,750 from Defendant's
America First Thrift account.

Defendant should be awarded the

remainder of each account.
APPROVAL AS TO FORM

ROBERT L. MOODY

DATED t h i s J%3

day o f J 4 a r p t t T ^ 9 3 .

J

r;<5TavuVsS
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4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the-foregoing
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this S
day of
March, 1993.
Robert L. Moody
2525 North Canyon Rd.
Provo, UT 84604

DANA D. BURROWS
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DANA D. BURROWS - 5405
Attorney for Plaintiff
387 West Center
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone: (801) 222-9700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

ORDER AMENDING DECREE OF
DIVORCE

:

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

:

Defendant.

Civil No. CV 87 2408

:

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 23rd day of
September, 1992, pursuant to those issues that were remanded by the
Court of Appeals.
Court's

further

The Appellate Court has remanded for this

consideration

the

division

of

the parties1

property. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented by her
attorney of record, Dana D. Burrows.

Defendant also appeared

personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L.
Moody.
parties

Both parties gave testimony, as did other witnesses.
each

introduced

several

stipulations into the record.

exhibits

and

stated

The

their

Being thereby and otherwise fully

apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and filings regarding
this matter, this Court, having taken the matter under advisement
and having issued its Memorandum Decision, and having entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now enters the following
Order Amending the Decree of Divorce:
1
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1.

A Decree of Divorce in the above-entitled matter was

entered on October 5, 1989.
2.

The Defendant having appealed several of the issues to

the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals having rendered a
ruling and having remanded to this Court for further consideration
of the division of personal property:
A.

Plaintiff shall be awarded as her equitable share of

the parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right, title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements—including the mobile home—
situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant is
ordered to deed and deliver such [realty to Plaintiff.
B.

Defendant

shall

retain

all

right,

title

and

interests in and to the parties1 realty and improvements—including
the mobile home—situated at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove,
Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600
North, Highland, Utah.
C.

Such

division

is

equitable

considering

the

exceptional circumstances which are considered during the time that
the parties lived together prior to their marriage as well as owing
to the time periods during which such equities were acquired in
relation to the marital relationship that existed between the
parties after solemnization of their marriage, owing to the
respective contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the
properties by each party, owing to the fact that such division
preserves the long-established residence of Plaintiff and her minor
2
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daughter as well as the minor's school and religious associations,
and owing to the fact that such division approximates a near equal
division of the monetary values of the properties, owing to the
fact that Plaintiff was a major contributor as to the labor
performed and arranged which improved the properties, owing to the
fact that Plaintiff was employed and provided other necessities for
Defendant which freed up Defendant's income to make the actual
payments on the properties prior to the parties' marriage, owing to
the age of the parties and the duration of the marriage and the
fact that Plaintiff gave up substantial earning capacity at the
request of Defendant, owing to the fact that Defendant has no
alimony or child support obligation to the Plaintiff and that the
real property is the only remaining assets to be divided and owing
to the fact that Plaintiff's contributions toward the growth of
Defendant's separate property vastly enhanced the value of said
properties.
3.

Defendant shall be held solely and individually liable

for all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty,
improvements, and mobile home situated at 640 South 50 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah,

Defendant shall hold Plaintiff harmless

therefrom.
4.

Each party is awarded a one-half interest in the other

party's retirement that accumulated from the date of the parties'
ceremonial marriage until entry of the Decree of Divorce.

Both

parties shall cooperate and provide the necessary information to
the other parties so that Qualified Domestic Relations Orders may
3
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be implemented.
5.

Each party is responsible for their own attorney's fees

and court costs incurred in pursuing the issues remanded by the
Court of Appeals.
6,

The

parties

have

stipulated

and

the

judgment

for

Plaintiff against Defendant for her equitable share of the parties
savings in the sum of $3,150 remains in full force and effect.
This judgment represents $400 from Defendant!s Deseret Bank account
and

$2,750

from

Defendant's

America

First

Thrift

account.

Defendant should be awarded the remainder of each account.
APPROVAL AS TO FORM

ROBERT L. MOODY

DATED this J23

day of

1993,

!

^Y M. HARDING <jT/f ' / ^ < ^ \ \
4 - 5 0 4 MAILING CERTIFICATE w

~ ^

—

I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t co]Ay QJL the^oregc&ncj
was m a i l e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , this°:'%j>
.^day o±
' rf
March, 1993.
^ "^~
^

^.drZ'

'I AV?*0*

Robert L. Moody
2525 North Canyon Rd.
Provo, UT 84604
^t^sa-

DANA D. BURROWS
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

>S?

****•*****•*•*•*••***

HELLEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

-vs-

CV 87 2408

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*******••***••***•**•

The Court, having conducted the trial of this matter on
February 7th, 1989 and having taken all issues under advisement,
will rule at this time.
The Court finds that the parties in this action are
residents of Utah County, and the Court has jurisdiction. Each
of the parties is granted a divorce against the other on grounds
of irreconcilable differences. The Court finds that such grounds
exist. The Court will not award alimony to either party.
There was an issue raised at trial as to exactly when
the marital relationship between the parties began. The Court
finds, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the parties
began to carry on a marriage like relationship on or about
January 1, 1980, which was several years before the marriage was
actually solemnized.
The Court considered a number of factors in determining
that the marital relationship began in 1980. Among these is the
fact that the defendant stayed in the plaintiff's trailer with
her when he was not working out of state. The defendant had the
plaintiff's trailer moved onto a lot which he was paying for, and
did not charge rent.
The plaintiff made improvements on the

1

property such as would be expected of a married couple.
The
defendant paid debts and obligations for the plaintiff including
substantial debts to the I.R.S. and the State Tax Commission.
The plaintiff's child with the defendant's consent was enrolled
in school under the name Walters. While working out of state,
the defendant sent the plaintiff money to live on. Based on the
foregoing circumstances, the Court finds that the parties
established a marital relationship beginning on or about January
1st, 1980.
This is an approximate date because the Court does
not have sufficient evidence to fix an exact date.
Because the Court considers the parties to have begun
their marital relationship on January 1, 1980, plaintiff is
entitled to a share of defendant's retirement benefits accrued
during the existence of the marriage. The formula which is to be
used to apportion the plaintiff's share of the retirement benefit
is found in Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987).
The plaintiff will not receive any retirement benefits until the
defendant retires.
If for any reason the defendant does not
qualify for the benefit, neither will the plaintiff. In order to
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become
available, plaintiff's counsel must prepare an order which is to
be filed with the defendant's employer which will give the
instructions for payment of retirement benefits to the plaintiff.
The formula which should be used in the order is "one half of his
total monthly payment times the fraction in which the numerator
consists of the number of years or months they were married
during which the defendant was employed by the federal government
and the denominator is the total number of years or months
defendant was in such employment."
Marchant, at 206.
The
fraction cannot be determined until the defendant retires.
If
the parties wish to avoid the need to enter such an order, they
may wish to consider a cash settlement of the retirement
benefits.
2

The real property which is at issue was partially
acquired before the marriage, and partially after. Considering
when the properties were obtained, and how they were paid for,
the Court finds the following to be an equitable division of the
real property.
The plaintiff is to receive the property in
Pleasant Grove where her mobile home is located free and clear.
The defendant may keep the Highland property which he acquired
before the marriage, and the other Pleasant Grove property
subject to the $5,000.00 encumbrance which is still owing on that
property.
The Court finds that this is a fair division of the
property which was either acquired or paid for during the
marriage.
The Court, having no evidence as to the amount of money
in the Deseret Bank, or the America First accounts during or
before the marriage, will award plaintiff half of each of those.
Plaintiff is to receive $400.00 from the Deseret Bank Account,
and $2750.00 of the America First account.
The Court has no evidence of values with which to
divide the disputed personal property of the parties.
The
parties are therefore given the option of either agreeing on a
division of property between themselves, or having one party
prepare two lists of property and the other selecting a list. If
the parties have not used one of these methods to divide the
property within 10 days, the Court orders the property sold and
the proceeds divided.
The Court will consider the issue of attorney's fees
upon submission of affidavits by counsel.
Counsel for plaintiff to prepare findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and a decree of divorce, and an order
regarding retirement benefits, if necessary, and submit them to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to filing with the
Court for signature.

3

Dated this 15th day of February, 1989
BY

cc:

Robert L. Moody, Esq.
Thomas H. Means, Esq.
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222
Attorney for Plaintiff
3 63 North University Avenue
Suite 103
P.O. Box 2283
Provo, Utah, 84603
[801] 377-7980

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

v

]
;)

FINDINGS OP FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,

)

No. CV 87 2408

Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial on the 7th day of
February, 1989. Plaintiff appeared personally and was represented
by her attorney of record, Thomas H. Means. Defendant also appeared
personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Robert L.
Moody. Both parties gave testimony, as did Plaintiff's daughter,
Sabrina Gunderson. The parties each introduced several exhibits and
stated their stipulations into the record. Being thereby and
otherwise fully apprised of the stipulations, facts, law, and
filings regarding this matter, this Court, having taken the matter

1

under advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, now
hereby enters the following

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff was a resident of Utah County at the time of the
filing of her Complaint and for at least three months prior
thereto. Defendant was a resident of Utah County at the time of the
filing of his Counterclaim and for at least three months prior
thereto.
2. The parties1 marriage was solemnized on 5 October, 1984, in
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
3. No children have been born of this marriage and Plaintiff
is not pregnant. Plaintiff has a minor daughter, Shirley Schantell
Hunter (Walters) from a prior marriage, born 15 May, 1976, who
resided with the parties during the entire period when the parties
resided together. Plaintiff has another daughter, Sabrina
Gunderson, now married, who resided with the parties for a short
period when Plaintifffs mobile home was situated at 155 South 12 00
West, Orem, Utah.
4. During the marriage, differences have developed between the
parties, which differences the parties have unsuccessfully
attempted to resolve. Such differences persist.
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5. The parties have lived separate and apart from and since on
or about 10 November, 1987,
6. Plaintiff and her daughter, Shirley Schantell Hunter
(Walters) have both resided in their present residence situated at
625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, continuously since in or
about May, 1980. Plaintiff's daughter has attended the elementary
and secondary schools servicing that address for her entire
education and has been and is a member of the local ward of the
church also servicing that address. Prior to May, 1980, Plaintiff
and her minor daughter resided in the same mobile home which was
then located at 155 South 1200 West, Orem, Utah. This mobile home
has been the minor's only home.
7. Defendant has been employed as a civilian employee of the
federal government from and since 1967 through the time of trial.
8. During the parties' marriage Plaintiff has been an employee
of United States Steel Corporation except for a period when her
employer ceased operations at the Geneva plant which was the
location where she was employed. At the time of trial, Plaintiff
had been re-employed by Geneva Steel for a period of approximately
one year.
9. Neither party appears to be presently in need of or
entitled to the continuing financial support of the other, either
in the form alimony or child support.
3

10. The parties established a marriage-like relationship
several years before their marriage was actually solemnized.
While it is not possible to determine from the evidence the precise
date when the parties began to cohabit, Plaintiff has established
by a preponderance of the evidence, and it is reasonable from the
evidence to find that such relationship commenced on or about 1
January, 1980, and continued from and since that time through the
time the marriage was solemnized and until the parties separated.
From and since 1 January, 1980, the parties cohabited and
commingled their efforts and their earnings in a manner such as
would be expected of a married couple. The evidence which supports
such finding is as follows:
a. The parties met on the Defendant's birthday, 4
December, 1978.
b. At the time they met Plaintiff resided in her mobile
home which was situated on a rental space at 155 South 12 00 West,
Orem, Utah. Although Defendant's employment sometimes required
temporary duty (TDY) assignments out of state at guided missile
sights, beginning shortly after the parties first met, when not on
TDY assignments, Defendant stayed with Plaintiff in her mobile
home.
c. In May of 1980, Defendant purchased, in his own name,
a trailer pad at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. At that
4
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same time the parties moved Plaintiff's mobile home onto that pad
where they continued to co-habit. Defendant paid for the costs of
moving the mobile home to the Pleasant Grove location as well as
the costs incurred for culinary water and sewer connections.
d. Defendant did not charge Plaintiff rent for the
placement of her mobile home on the pad or for her use of the
realty as her residence.
e. At various times when Defendant was on TDY
assignments, Plaintiff helped arranged for and make physical
improvements to the Defendant's realty on which her mobile home was
placed and to another parcel that Defendant was purchasing and
situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah. Such improvements
included the laying of concrete pads at each location, leveling,
laying water lines, planting of a lawn, and construction of outbuildings and a metal building.
f. While employed, Plaintiff contributed her earnings
toward the purchase of food, utilities, and other regular living
expenses. Defendant's earnings were used to make payments on the
realty.
g. When Plaintiff was not employed, and while Defendant
was on TDY assignments, Defendant sent monies home to maintain
Plaintiff and her daughter.
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h. Defendant made contributions toward Plaintiff's
separate debts owed to the I.R.S., the Utah State Tax Commission,
an encumbrance on her mobile home, and debts owed for the purchase
of her car, a T.V., and medical expenses incurred in an automobile
accident.
i. Although not adopted by Defendant, Plaintiff's minor
daughter from a prior marriage, with Defendant's knowledge and
permission, and prior to solemnization of the marriage, attended
school under Defendant's family name of Walters.
j. Defendant listed his address on his federal and state
income tax returns as 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah - the
same as Plaintiff's residence - for each of the years 1979, 1980,
1981, 1982, and 1983.
k. Defendant listed Plaintiff's daughter "Schanny" in his
federal income tax returns under the category of "dependent
children who lived with you" for each of the years 1982, 1983, and
1984.
1. The evidence does not indicate that the parties'
relationship changed after the solemnization of their marriage.
11. At the time of trial Defendant maintained an account at
Deseret Bank with a balance in an amount of $800.00 and an account
at America First Thrift with a balance in the amount of $5500.00.
This Court is without evidence sufficient to establish whether
6
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these balances were accumulated prior to or after the parties
established their marital relationship. However, the balance of the
America First Thrift account appears to have been accumulated after
10 November, 1987, the date on or about which Defendant was served
with a Temporary Restraining Order which is the same date when
Defendant withdrew $3000.00 from the account.
12. As of the date of trial Defendant was the record owner of
four parcels of realty, to wit:
a. Parcel 162 5 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is
located Plaintiff's aforementioned mobile home, a 1974 72 foot
Concord.
b. Parcel 2640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, on which is
located a 1975 70 foot Brighton mobile home.
c. Parcel 36072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
d. Parcel 474 6 West 600 North, Orem, Utah
13. Parcel 1 was deeded to Defendant on 27 May, 1980. Parcel 2
was deeded to Defendant on 18 July, 1985. Parcel 3 was deeded to
Defendant on 4 August, 1978. Defendant entered into a Uniform Real
Estate Contract for the purchase of parcel 3 in July, 1977,
7
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reciting a down-payment of $2,200.00 with annual payments toward
the balance of $5,800.00 in amounts of $1,000.00 each scheduled to
commence in June, 1978. Defendant made a final payment for parcel 3
in the amount of $1,682.15 on 23 May, 1981. The parties have
stipulated that Defendant has no equitable interest in the Orem
parcel and that he is listed as legal owner of parcel 4 only as an
accommodation to his son to enable his son to acquire equitable
interests in the property. Parcels 1 and 3 are not encumbered by
any debt. Parcel 2 is encumbered by a purchase money debt with a
balance as of the date of trial in the amount of approximately
$5,000.00.
14. Defendant testified as to the purchase prices and costs of
improvements dedicated to parcels 1, 2, and 3 respectively and to
his opinion of their respective total values as of the date of
trial. The parties have stipulated to this Court f s acceptance into
evidence of written appraisals of the parcels offered by Plaintiff
and conducted by Thomas C. Lamoreaux, a Certified Review Appraiser.
This Court considers Mr. Lamoreaux1s assessment of the valuations
of the parcels more credible than Defendant's own assessment for
the following reasons:
a. Defendant's assessments are based almost exclusively
on a compilation of purchase price and costs of improvements to
each parcel.
8

Mr. Lamoreaux's assessments are based on several
factors including location, access to main arterial roads and
shopping, existence or non-existence of public improvements,
adverse easements, and adequate drainage, room size and layout,
insulation, adequacy of storage and closets, appeal and
marketability, remaining economic life, availability for expansion,
comparisons to recent sales of similar and proximate properties,
income potential, highest and best use, and replacement cost.
b. Defendant testified to having no significant training
or experience as an appraiser or builder of similar properties.
Mr. Lamoreaux's Qualifications Summary attached to his
appraisal indicates that he has attended courses in real estate
appraisal given by the American Institute of Appraisers, that he
has appraised similar properties in the subject area from 1974 to
the present, that he has experience as a supervisor and general
contractor of residential construction from 1971 to 1974, that he
is a designated appraiser for the Federal National Mortgage
Association, a Certified Review Appraiser, and a licensed Realtor,
and that he is a member of the National Association of Review
Appraisers and the International Right of Way Association.
Upon the foregoing, this Court accepts and adopts the
valuations placed on the properties by Mr. Lamoreaux, to wit:
Parcel 1, with improvements & mobile home:

$20,000.00

9
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Parcel 2, with improvements & mobile home:

$20,000.00

Parcel 3, with improvements:

$10,000.00

15. The Court finds that because of the marriage-like
relationship that began on 1 January, 1980, Plaintiff is entitled
to a share of Defendant's retirement benefits accrued during the
existence of the marriage-like relationship. The formula which is
to be used to apportion the Plaintiff's share of the retirement
benefit is found in Marchant v Marchant. 743 P2nd 199, (Utah App
1987) . The Plaintiff shall not receive any retirement benefits
until the Defendant retires. If for any reason the Defendant does
not qualify for the benefit neither will the Plaintiff. In order to
become eligible to receive retirement benefits when they become
available, the Court finds that the Plaintiff's counsel must
prepare an order which is to be filed with the Defendant's employer
which will give the instructions for payment of retirement benefits
to the Plaintiff. The formula which should be used in the Order is
"one-half of his total monthly payment times the fraction in which
the numerator consists of the number of years or months they
maintained the marriage-like relationship during which the
Defendant was employed by the federal government and the
denominator is the total number of years or months the Defendant
was in such employment."
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16. With the exception of the aforementioned encumbrance
affecting the property at 640 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, and
the parties1 separate debts incurred since the date of their
separation on 10 November, 1987, there exist no marital debts for
which either party is liable either jointly or individually.
17. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff should be
awarded as her sole and separate property the parties1 1980
Chrysler automobile.
18. The parties have stipulated that Defendant should be
awarded as his sole and separate property the parties1 1979
Chevrolet pick-up truck.
19. The parties have submitted their respective written lists
of the other personalty of their marriage and have testified as to
their respective claims to and needs for such personalty. The
parties have each claimed entitlement to and need for many of the
same items of personalty. From the evidence this Court is not able
to ascertain or assign values to the various items of personalty
listed or claimed by the parties nor does this Court have evidence
from which it is able to determine, by a preponderance of the
evidence which, if any, of such personalty is separate property as
opposed to property accumulated during the parties1 marital
relationship.
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20. Plaintiff has incurred an obligation in excess of $4000.00
for attorney's fees reasonable to the prosecution of her Complaint.
The hours expended as well as the hourly rate charged were
reasonable in light of the complexity of the matter, the results
obtained, and the hourly rate commonly charged for similar actions
in this area. Plaintiff is in need of an award from Defendant to
compensate her for a portion of said attorney's fees.

12
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving her
marriage to Defendant.
2. Defendant is entitled to a Decree of Divorce dissolving his
marriage to Plaintiff.
3. Neither party is entitled to an award of alimony or other
order of lump sum or periodic financial support from the other.
4. This Court need make no orders regarding liability for
family or marital debts except that debt affecting the realty
situated at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and except
those separate debts incurred by the parties respectively after the
date of their separation, as are addressed hereinbelow.
5. Each party should be held solely and individually liable
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after
the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987.
6. Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing $400.00
from Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and $2750.00 from Defendant's
America First Thrift account. Defendant should be awarded the
remainder of each account.
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7• Plaintiff should be awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant
should be ordered to deed and deliver such realty to Plaintiff.
Defendant should retain all right, title, and interests in and to
the parties1 realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 64 0 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty
and improvements situated at 6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
Such division is equitable owing to the time periods during which
such equities were acquired in relation to the marital relationship
that existed between the parties both prior to and after
solemnization of their marriage, owing to the respective
contributions made to acquisition and improvement of the properties
by each party, owing to the fact that such division preserves the
long established residence of Plaintiff and her minor daughter as
well as the minor's school and religious associations, and owing to
the fact that such division approximates a near equal division of
the monitory values of the properties.
8. Defendant should be held solely and individually liable for
all debt encumbering, associated with, or owing for the realty,
improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0 South 50 West,
14

Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant should hold Plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
9. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile.
10. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate
property the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck.
11. It is proper that the parties1 personalty as noted in
their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and
accepted as evidence by this Court, excluding the aforementioned
automobiles and mobile homes, be marshalled, sold, and the proceeds
therefrom divided equally between them.
12. Plaintiff is entitled to a proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his
employment during the marital relationship. Such share should be
determined according to the formula set forth in Marchant v
Marchant, 743 P2nd 199 (Utah App. 1987) . Accordingly, Plaintiff
should not receive her share of such benefits until Defendant
retires. If for any reason, Defendant does not qualify for such
benefits, neither will Plaintiff. Plaintiff's proportionate share
should be one half (50%) of the total amount of all of Defendant's
monthly benefit payments multiplied by the fraction in which the
numerator is the number of months comprising the period beginning
on 1 January, 1980, and ending on the date of trial of this matter,
15

(109 months) and the denominator is the total number of months
Defendant is employed by the federal government. The fraction
cannot be determined until such time as Defendant shall retire. If
Defendant separates from civil service in advance of retirement,
and withdraws his contributions, Plaintiff should receive a portion
of Defendant's refund based upon the above-noted fraction.
Plaintiff is entitled to an award of such portion of Defendant's
civil service retirement benefits as well as a Qualified Domestic
Relations Order setting forth her rights in Defendant's civil
service retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth
hereinabove.
13. It is reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as and for her
reasonable attorney's fees the sum of $1000.00.
Dated this y

day of J^gwat, 1989.

Approved as to form:
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THOMAS H. MEANS, #2222
Attorney for Plaintiff
363 North University
Suite 103
P.O. Box 2283
Provo, Utah, 84603
[801] 377-7980

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,
v

]
AMENDED
;) DECREE OF DIVORCE
;

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
Defendant.

]> No. CV 87 2408
)

This matter, having come on regularly for trial on the 7th day
of February, 1989, and this Court, having taken the matter under
advisement and having issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION, and having
entered its written FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:

1. Plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving
her marriage to Defendant.
2. Defendant is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce dissolving
his marriage to Plaintiff.
3. Each party is hereby held solely and individually liable
for any and all debt incurred in his or her individual name after
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the date of their separation on 10 November, 1987. Each party shall
hold the other harmless for any and all such debts incurred in
his/her individual name after 10 November, 1987.
4. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the
parties1 savings accounts the sum of $3150.00 representing a
$4 00.00 share of Defendant's Deseret Bank Account and a $2750.00
share of Defendant's America First Thrift account. Defendant is
hereby awarded the remainder of each account.
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her equitable share of the
parties' equity in the realty acquired by their joint efforts
during their marital relationship, all right title and interest in
and to the realty and improvements - including the mobile home situated at 625 South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. More
particularly described as:
Lot 9, Plat D, Pleasant Grove Mobile Home Estates
Defendant is hereby ordered to deed and deliver such realty to
Plaintiff.
6. It is hereby ordered that Defendant retain all right,
title, and interests in and to the parties' realty and improvements
- including the mobile home - situated at 64 0 South 50 West,
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the realty and improvements situated at
6072 West 9600 North, Highland, Utah.
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7. Defendant shall be and is hereby held solely and
individually liable for all debt encumbering, associated with, or
owing for the realty, improvements, and mobile home situated at 64 0
South 50 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. Defendant shall hold Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
8. Plaintiff is hereby awarded as her sole and separate
property the parties1 1980 Chrysler automobile.
9. Defendant is hereby awarded as his sole and separate
property, the parties1 1979 Chevrolet pick-up truck.
10. It is hereby ordered that the parties1 personalty as noted
in their respective lists of personalty heretofore submitted to and
accepted as evidence by this Court - but excepting the
aforementioned automobiles and mobile homes - be marshalled, sold,
and the proceeds therefrom divided equally between the parties.
11. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits earned through his
employment with the federal government during the marital
relationship, which is and shall consist of one half (50%) of the
total amount of all of Defendant's monthly benefit payments
multiplied by the fraction in which the numerator is 109 and the
denominator is the total number of months Defendant is employed by
the federal government. The fraction shall be determined at such
time as Defendant shall retire. Plaintiff shall not receive her
3

share of such benefits until Defendant retires. If Defendant
separates from civil service in advance of retirement and withdraws
his contributions, Plaintiff shall receive a portion of such refund
based on the above-noted fraction. If for any reason, Defendant
does not qualify for such benefits, neither will Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is hereby granted and awarded such proportionate share of
Defendant's civil service retirement benefits as well as a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order setting forth her rights in
Defendant's retirement benefits and authorizing and instructing the
United States Office of Personnel Management to pay to her all sums
to which she is entitled pursuant to the formula set forth
hereinabove and hereby granted and awarded to her,
12. Plaintiff is hereby granted and Defendant is hereby
ordered to pay as and for Plaintifffs reasonable attorney's fees
the sum of $1000.00.
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Dated this >J^OL day of August, 1989.

Fourth Judicial Distric
Utah County
Approved as to form:

R o b e r t L.

Moody, No.

2302

TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE

Attorneys for Defendant
2525 North Canyon Road
P. O. Box 1466
Provo, Utah 84603
(801) 373-2721

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HELEN JAYNE WALTERS,
Plaintiff,

EXPENSES PAID BY DEFENDANT
TO ENABLE PLAINTIFF TO
PRESERVE ASSETS

VS.

LEWIS MARK WALTERS,
C i v i l No.

CV 87 2408

Defendant.
Judge Ray M. Harding
I.R.S.

$4,000.00

State Tax Commission

$2,700.00

Payment on Trailer

$3,000.00

Payment on Car Loan

$400.00

Payment on T.V. Loan

$150.00

Wyoming Accident Bills

$1,000.00

Costs to move Trailer
from Orem to Pleasant Grove

$521.00

TOTAL:

DATED t h i s

$10,371.00
IA
Cr

day of February,

1989.
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30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized.
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be
legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out
of a contract between two consenting parties who:
(a) are capable of giving consent;
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the
provisions of this chapter;
(c) have cohabited;
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; and
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and general reputation as husband and wife.
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section
must occur during the relationship described in Subsection (1), or within one
year following the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases.
History: C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 246, § 2.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch.
246, § 5 provided that if any provision of Chap-

ter 246, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of the chapter is to be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.

30-1-5. Marriage solemnization — Before unauthorized
person — Validity,
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to have authority
therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority, if consummated in the
belief of the parties or either of them that he had such authority and that they
have been lawfully married.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1187;
C.L. 1917, § 2970; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
40-1-5.

Cross-References. — Authorized person required to solemnize marriage, § 30-1-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Foreign common-law marriages.
This section does not render valid a commonlaw marriage entered into in a foreign state

where such marriages are recognized. In re
Vetas' Estate, 110 Utah 187, 170 P.2d 183
(1946).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 52 Am. Jur. 2d Marriage
§§ 39, 106.
C.J.S. — 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 29.
A.L.R. — Validity of marriage as affected by

lack of legal authority of person solemnizing it,
13 A.L.R4th 1323.
Key Numbers. — Marriage <&=* 27.

48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of partners*
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be
determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules:
(1) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of
capital or advances to the partnership property, and share equally in the
profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied; and must contribute towards the losses, whether of
capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his share
in the profits.
(2) The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the
ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its
business or property.
(3) A partner who in aid of the partnership makes any payment or
advance beyond the amount of capital which he agreed to contribute shall
be paid interest from the date of the payment or advance.
(4) A partner shall receive interest on the capital contributed by him
only from the date when repayment should be made.
(5) All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of
the partnership business.
(6) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership
business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs.
(7) No person can become a member of a partnership without the consent of all the partners.
(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the
partnership business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but no
act in contravention of any agreement between the partners may be done
rightfully without the consent of all the partners.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 18; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-15.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Existence of partnership.
Gifts to members of family.
Remuneration to partner for services.
Repayment of contributions.
Sharing profits and losses.
Existence of partnership.
An organization of workers, formed for the
purpose of performing and undertaking contracts for bricklaying jobs, did not have the essential elements of either a general or limited
partnership, where all the equipment used by
workers belonged to one individual who had
sole authority to make contracts for himself
and the organization, and where workers were
not entitled to share in profits equally or on
any fixed percentage basis, were not chargeable for losses, and were not permitted to de-

termine the means or methods of operating.
Johanson Bros. Bldrs. v. Board of Review, 118
Utah 384, 222 P.2d 563 (1950).
Gifts to members of family.
Where father intended at the time of dissolution of family partnership to make a gift to his
son and wife of certain amounts of the capital
contributions he had made to the partnership,
and intended that such gift be accomplished by
each partner's sharing according to respective
partnership interests in the total assets of the
partnership including the contributions made
by the father, and the other partners relied on
such gift, the agreement between the parties
superseded Subsection (1) of this section. West
v. West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965).
Remuneration to partner for services.
Where partners had made no agreement as

20

GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
to the partners' wages or compensation, it was
not error for the trial court to exclude evidence
that one partner did more work than the other,
for partners receive no compensation for action
in the partnership business (other than splitting the profits) unless there is an agreement
or provision for such remuneration. Keller v.
Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255 P.2d 118 (1953).
Generally, a partner is not entitled to any
remuneration for his services in the absence of
an agreement by the partners to that effect.
Chambers v. Sims, 13 Utah 2d 371, 374 P.2d
841 (1962).
Where the partnership agreement or a specific practice, acquiesced in by the partners,
contemplates the payment of salary to one or
more partners, but no amounts are specified, it
is presumed that payment of reasonable salaries is intended. Chambers v. Sims, 13 Utah 2d
371, 374 P.2d 841 (1962).
While generally a partner is not entitled to
any remuneration for his services while acting
in the partnership business in the absence of a
partnership agreement providing for such remuneration, such an agreement for remuneration may be either expressed or implied.
Knutson v. Lauer, 627 P.2d 66 (Utah 1981).

48-1-16

In the absence of an agreement providing for
remuneration, partner was not entitled to remuneration for services rendered while acting
in the partnership business. Nupetco Assocs. v.
Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983).
Repayment of contributions.
Upon dissolution and distribution of partnership assets, this section does not authorize the
deduction of depreciation from advances made
for capital improvements in repayment of the
partners' contributions, and trial court erred
when it ordered such deduction for depreciation because the partnership agreement did
not authorize such deduction and to allow the
deduction would produce an unjust result.
Knutson v. Lauer, 627 P.2d 66 (Utah 1981).
Sharing profits and losses.
Although obligation to share losses is not directly expressed in partnership agreement,
generally agreement to share profits, nothing
being said about losses, amounts prima facie to
agreement to share losses also. Bentley v.
Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736 (1908).
In absence of agreement or proof of agreement to contrary, partners will divide profits
and losses equally. Kimball v. McCornick, 70
Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur.
ship §§ 409
C.J.S. —
A.L.R. —

2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnerto 418, 469 to 475.
68 C.J.S. Partnership § 76.
Partner's breach of fiduciary duty

to copartner on sale of partnership interest to
another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122.
Key Numbers. — Partnership @=> 70.

48-1-16. Partnership books.
The partnership books shall be kept, subject to any agreement between the
partners, at the principal place of business of the partnership, and every
partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy any of
them.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 19; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-16.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §§ 962 to 967.

C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 91.
Key Numbers. — Partnership <s=> 80.

TITLE 48
PARTNERSHIP
Chapter
1. General Partnership.
2a. Utah Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act.
2b. Utah Limited Liability Company Act.

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
Section
48-1-37.

Rules for distribution.

48-1-37. Rules for distribution.
In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution the following
rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary:
(1) The assets of the partnership are:
(a) The partnership property.
(b) The contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of
all the liabilities specified in Subsection (2).
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order of payment, as
follows:
(a) Those owing to creditors other than partners.
(b) Those owing to partners other than for capital and profits.
(c) Those owing to partners in respect of capital.
(d) Those owing to partners in respect of profits.
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of their declaration in Subsection (1) to the satisfaction of the liabilities.
(4) The partners shall contribute as provided by Subsection 48-1-15(1)
the amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities; but if any, but not all, of
the partners are insolvent, or, not being subject to process, refuse to contribute, the other partners shall contribute their share of the liabilities,
and in the relative proportions in which they share the profits the additional amount necessary to pay the liabilities.
(5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors, or any person appointed by
the court, shall have the right to enforce the contributions specified in
Subsection (4).
(6) Any partner or his legal representative shall have the right to enforce the contributions specified in Subsection (4) to the extent of the
amount which he has paid in excess of his share of the liability.
(7) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for the
contributions specified in Subsection (4).
(8) When partnership property and the individual properties of the
partners are in the possession of a court for distribution, partnership
creditors shall have priority on partnership property and separate credi-

tors on individual property, saving the rights of lien or secured creditors
as heretofore.
(9) Where a partner has become bankrupt or his estate is insolvent, the
claims against his separate property shall rank in the following order:
(a) Those owing to separate creditors.
(b) Those owing to partnership creditors.
(c) Those owing to partners by way of contribution.
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 40; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-37; L. 1992, ch. 30, § 89.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-

ment, effective April 27, 1992, made stylistic
changes throughout the section.
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ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
48-2a-102. Name.
(1) The name of each limited partnership as set forth in its certificate of
limited partnership:
(a) shall contain the words "limited partnership," "limited," "L.P.," or
"Ltd.";
(b) may not contain the name of a limited partner unless:
(i) it is also the name of a general partner or the corporate name of
a corporate general partner; or
(ii) the business of the limited partnership had been carried on
under that name before the admission of that limited partner;
(c) may not contain the words "association/' "corporation/' or "incorporated/' or any abbreviation thereof, or any words or any abbreviation
thereof which are of like import in any other language; and
(d) may not, without the written consent of the United States Olympic
Committee, contain the words "Olympic," "Olympiad," or "Citius Altius
Fortius."
(2) No person or entity other than a limited partnership formed or registered under this title may use any of the terms "limited," "limited partnership," "Ltd.," or "L.P." in its name in this state except that any foreign corporation whose actual name includes the word "limited" or "Ltd." may use its
actual name in this state if "corporation," "incorporated," or any abbreviation
of them is also used. Notwithstanding any of the preceding provisions of Sub-

